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Abstract
Following Timothy Smiley’s (1963) influential proposal, it has become standard practice to char-
acterise notions of relative necessity in terms of simple strict conditionals. However, Lloyd Hum-
berstone (1981) and others have highlighted various flaws with Smiley’s now standard account of
relative necessity. In their recent article, Bob Hale and Jessica Leech (2017) propose a novel account
of relative necessity designed to overcome the problems facing the standard account. Nevertheless,
the current article argues that Hale & Leech’s account suffers from its own defects, some of which
Hale & Leech are aware of but underplay. To supplement this criticism, the article offers an al-
ternative account of relative necessity which overcomes these defects. This alternative account is
developed in a quantified modal propositional logic and is shown model-theoretically to meet sev-
eral desiderata of an account of relative necessity.
There are many different notions of necessity. For example, it may well be practically impossible for
someone to run from London to Oxford in under three hours, but surely it is physically possible for that
person to do so. Similarly, it is physically necessary that nothing goes faster than the speed of light, but
many would claim that it is metaphysically possible for something to do so.
Although there are various different kinds of necessity, it is commonly assumed that there is an abso-
lute notion of necessity which is broader than all other notions of necessity. Moreover, given this notion
of absolute necessity, it is also widely assumed that all other kinds of necessity can be characterised in
terms of it. Indeed, since Timothy Smiley’s (1963) influential proposal, it has become standard practice
to characterise notions of relative necessity in terms of certain absolutely strict conditionals. According
to this proposal, the relative necessity of some proposition p can be characterised in terms of the abso-
lute strict implication of p by some suitable sentential constant. For instance, on this view, the physical
necessity of a proposition p is equated with the absolute strict implication of p by a sentential constant
expressing the laws of physics.
Nevertheless, Lloyd Humberstone (1981) and others have highlighted various flaws with Smiley’s
now standard account of relative necessity. Aware of these flaws, in their recent article Bob Hale and
Jessica Leech (2017) propose a novel account of relative necessity designed to overcome the problems
facing the standard account. However, although Hale & Leech’s account is an improvement on the
standard account in certain respects, it suffers from its own defects. The current article outlines these
defects, some of which Hale & Leech are aware of but underplay, and emphasises their seriousness.
The article then defends an account of relative necessity without these defects, to which the use of
propositional quantification is key. It is then shown model-theoretically that this new account meets
several desiderata of an account of relative necessity. The article concludes with a brief discussion of
certain complexities which arise if various background assumptions are lifted.
For helpful discussion and feedback, thanks are due to Arif Ahmed, Robbie Williams, Timothy Williamson, and an audience
at the Twelfth Annual Cambridge Graduate Conference on the Philosophy of Mathematics and Logic, at which Arif Ahmed
provided comments on the paper. Special thanks are due to James Studd for particularly helpful feedback on earlier drafts, and
to two anonymous referees for this journal whose comments greatly improved the paper.
1 Absolute Necessity
On the prevailing conception, for a notion of necessity to be absolute is for it to be the broadest necessity:
that is, it is a matter of necessity that whatever is absolutely necessary is necessary in any other sense.
This conception is found in both Ian McFetridge (1990) and Bob Hale’s (1996) classic discussions of
absolute necessity. Moreover, in recent work, Andrew Bacon (2018) has shown how to formalise this
conception in a typed quantified modal language with quantification into operator position.
A slightly less formal version of Bacon’s official characterisation can be stated with the aid of the
following notion:1
ALAB i is as broad as  j iff ∀pk(i p→ j p) is true, whenever k is a necessity operator
ALAB encodes the popular idea that one notion of necessity is as broad as another just in case, as a
matter of necessity (in every sense), the latter deems as necessary every proposition which the former
deems necessary; the broader a notion of necessity, the more stringent it is. Put alternatively, a notion
of necessity is as broad as another just in case, as a matter of necessity (in every sense), any proposition
which is possible according to the latter is possible according to the former; the broader a notion of
necessity, the more inclusive its corresponding notion of possibility. To take an example, it is plausible
that physical necessity is as broad as practical necessity since, as a matter of necessity (in every sense),
anything which is practically possible is physically possible too. Given ALAB, the claim that absolute
necessity () is the broadest necessity can be expressed as follows:2
Absolute ∀pk(p→ j p) is true, whenever k and  j are necessity operators
To reiterate, according to this characterisation, absolute necessity is as broad as any notion of neces-
sity: for any proposition, it is a necessary matter (in every sense) that if that proposition is absolutely
necessary it is necessary in every sense.
It bears emphasis that ALAB and Absolute function as intended only if propositional necessitism is
assumed, here understood as the view that, in any sense of necessity, it is necessary which propositions
there are. Were propositional necessitism rejected, the propositional quantifiers in ALAB and Absolute
would not range over all absolutely possible propositions, depriving the principles of their intended
generality. As is typical in the literature, propositional necessitism will be a working assumption in what
follows.
According to one popular view, a natural candidate for absolute necessity is logical necessity. How-
ever, it is often unclear how logical necessity—thought of as a propositional operator, not a predicate
of expressions—is intended to be characterised. Nevertheless, under the assumption of Booleanism,
according to which propositions form a Boolean algebra under the usual truth-functional operations,
logical necessity can be characterised quite naturally. In the Boolean setting, there is a unique tautolo-
gous proposition—the top element of the algebra—which may be thought of as the logical truth. Thus,
in that setting, it is highly natural to characterise logical necessity as simply being identical with the tau-
1Bacon’s official working language is a functional type theory in which each type has a corresponding universal quantifier used
to generalise universally over things of that type. In Bacon’s (2018) terms, ALAB can be written as follows:
i ≥ j↔∀k(Nk→∀pk(i p→ j p))
Here, the subscripted boxes are expressions which take formulas as arguments and result in another sentence, ‘≥’ is an ex-
pression which takes expressions of the same type as subscripted boxes as arguments and results in a sentence, and ‘N’ is a
predicate which takes as arguments expressions of the same type as subscripted boxes to produce a sentence. On their intended
interpretation, ‘≥’ denotes the relation of being-as-broad-as and ‘N’ denotes the property (of properties of propositions) of
being-a-necessity-operator, which is defined in Bacon (2018, p. 735). Although ALAB in the main body of text mixes object-
and meta-language, it should be understood as an informal statement of the above formalisation which does not. Indeed, sim-
ilar principles in the main body of text may always be understood as informal statements of their formalisations in this typed
formal language.
2The assumption that there is a unique broadest necessity will be justified shortly.
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tologous proposition.3 Given such elegance, the article will simply adopt the hypothesis of Booleanism
to provide a stable background to the discussion. To be more precise, the article will adopt the assump-
tion that propositions form a complete Boolean algebra under the usual truth-functional operations, an
assumption which since Fine (1970) is familiar to the study of propositionally quantified modal logics.
As will be seen, Booleanism is an elegant working setting in which to adjudicate competing accounts of
relative necessity. Moreover, the final section discusses how the arguments of the article may be adapted
to non-Boolean settings.
Interestingly, given only the austere characterisation of absolute necessity in Absolute, one should
expect its logic to meet various conditions. To take a clear example, notice that Absolute strongly
suggests that  will conform to the 4 axiom:
4 p→p
After all, it is highly plausible that concatenations of modal operators express notions of necessity, and
so  will itself be a species of necessity. Thus, given ALAB,  must be as broad as . Similarly,
it is also plausible that  conforms to the T axiom, since surely  is as broad as some alethic notion of
necessity:
T p→ p
Finally, it is equally plausible that  conforms to the K axiom which is partly characteristic of normal
modal operators:
K (p→ q)→ (p→q)
Given that it is natural to expect that the ultimate logic of  should be closed under modus ponens,
necessitation, and uniform substitution, S4 will be treated as a lower bound on the logic of absolute
necessity.4
As a final piece of set up, we make the working assumption that absolute necessity is unique. This
assumption is usually taken to be implicit, however we shall enforce it explicitly by requiring notions of
necessity to be individuated by a criterion of intensional equivalence.5
Identity i = j iff ∀pk(i p↔ j p) is true, whenever k is a necessity operator
Informally, Identity states that notions of necessity are the same just in case it is necessary (in all senses)
that they apply to exactly the same propositions. This has the consequence that absolute necessity is
unique, for if  and ′ are absolute notions of necessity, then by Absolute they are as broad as one
another. However, by ALAB and Identity it must be that  and ′ are one and the same.
2 Relative Necessities
2.1 Characterising Relative Necessities
Relative necessities typically contrast with absolute necessity. Broadly speaking, relative necessities are
types of parameterised modals. For example, one might think of physical necessity—a paradigm relative
3Bacon (2018) investigates this characterisation of logical necessity (although Bacon uses the term ‘broad necessity’ instead).
See also Cresswell (1965) and Suszko (1971). Dorr (2016, p. 70) discusses how one might define a similar notion of necessity
in non-Boolean settings.
4Indeed, Bacon (2018) proves in his particular system of higher-order logic that absolute necessity meets all the principles of
S4 including a rule of necessitation.
5Identity will be rejected by those who think that intensional equivalence (according to every notion of necessity) is too coarse-
grained a criterion for individuating notions of necessity. According to that conception, there may be several absolute notions
of necessity, all of which are as broad as all other notions of necessity. However, those who reject Identity may still wish to
engage in the project of characterising non-absolute notions of necessity in terms of the absolute necessities. See both Dorr
(2016, sect. 5) and Bacon’s (2018) discussion of his ‘modalized functionality’ principle for related details.
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necessity—as necessity given the laws of physics. Similarly, one might think of metaphysical necessity
as necessity given some particular body of metaphysical truths. In light of these glosses, it is tempting
to think that in some sense all non-absolute, relative notions of necessity can be characterised in terms
of an absolute notion of necessity. For a given notion of relative i-necessity, all that would be required is
that one specifies ‘necessity given the i-laws’ purely in terms of absolute necessity, some vocabulary ξi
expressing the i-laws, and the logical symbols. More carefully, for each notion of relative necessity i,
there must be a true claim of the following form:
(iφ ↔ ψ), where ψ contains φ (and no propositional variables free in φ are bound in ψ), and φ
otherwise may contain only , ξi, and logical symbols
In this sense, each relative necessity could characterised in terms of an absolute notion of necessity.
Indeed, doing so is perhaps one way of making literal sense of the popular metaphorical claim that
absolute necessity is the source of all necessity.
Before considering different characterisations of relative necessity, three points bear emphasis. First,
it is helpful to clarify the target notion of relative necessity itself. Thus, to make the target explicit, the
class of necessities which will be of interest to the current article are exactly those notions of necessity
whose logic is characterised by a Kripke frame: the Kripke necessities. The target therefore does not
include so-called ‘linguistic necessities’ like ‘logical truth’, which are expressed by predicates of sen-
tences as opposed to propositional operators. Moreover, the target also excludes notions of necessity
which are expressed by non-normal modal operators. Such non-normal notions of necessity may be
rightfully classified as necessities in some broader sense; for example, Bacon’s (2018) notions of ne-
cessity are not required to meet the K axiom. However, it is reasonable not to target the non-normal
necessities for current purposes: the Kripke necessities themselves constitute an extremely natural class
of necessities which is highly non-trivial to characterise in terms of absolute necessity. Furthermore,
the Kripke necessities include the paradigm relative necessities, such as physical and metaphysical ne-
cessity, which initially motivated the characterisation project. In §4.2.3, it will be proven that there is
a precise sense in which the proposed definition of the relative necessities captures exactly the Kripke
necessities.
Second, to simplify the complexity of the official object-language, it will contain  as its only ne-
cessity operator. The object-language will therefore not contain modal operators corresponding to each
notion of relative necessity. Instead, relative necessities will be introduced as metalinguistic abbrevi-
ations for complex object-language formulae. Due to this simplification, the use of ‘relative necessity
operator’ throughout should be understood as covering the object-language formulae corresponding to
such metalinguistic abbreviations.6 However, to reiterate, when the article provides its positive account
of relative necessities, it will be shown that there is a precise sense in which each target relative notion
of necessity is expressed by some complex formulae of the object-language.
Finally, the use of ‘i-laws’ should be understood very liberally. The ‘i-laws’ for a given notion of
relative i-necessity are just some body of propositions which serve to relativise the notion of necessity,
and need not have the status of scientific laws. For example, in the case of necessity given Theresa
May’s goals in March 2019, the relevant body of propositions will comprise just those propositions
which she wished to realise (for instance, that Parliament passes her Withdrawal Agreement). This
liberal understanding of ‘i-laws’ is totally standard to the literature on relative necessities.
2.2 Smiley’s Standard Account
Historically, the ‘necessity given the i-laws’ locution has been formalised in terms of simple absolutely
strict conditionals. According to the standard account, for a proposition p to be i-necessary is for p
to be absolutely strictly implied by some sentential constant which expresses the i-laws. The idea is
widespread and at least dates back to Smiley’s (1963) influential discussion:
6Similarly, ‘necessity operator’ should be understood as meaning ‘relative necessity operator or the absolute necessity operator’.
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If we define OA [iA] as L(T → A) [(T → A)] then to assert OA [iA] is to assert that T
strictly implies A or that A is necessary relative to T . Since the pattern of the definition is
independent of the particular interpretation that may be put on T we can say that to the extent
that the standard alethic modal systems embody the idea of absolute or logical necessity,
the corresponding O-systems embody the idea of relative necessity—necessity relative to
an arbitrary proposition or body of propositions. They should therefore be appropriate for
the formalisation of any modal notion that can be analysed in terms of relative necessity.
To take an example, according to Smiley’s account a proposition p is physically necessary iff (L→ p)
is true, where L is a sentential constant expressing the laws of physics.7 Similarly, according to his
account a proposition p is metaphysically necessary iff (M→ p) is true, where M is some sentential
constant expressing the ‘laws’ of metaphysics (such as claims of identity and distinctness, and various
essentialist claims). Call this the standard account:
SA iφ =d f (Ψ→ φ), where Ψ is a sentential constant which expresses the ‘i-laws’
Despite the influence of Smiley’s standard account, Lloyd Humberstone (1981) and others have high-
lighted various flaws with it.8 Moreover, in their recent article, Bob Hale and Jessica Leech have care-
fully articulated and developed the problems facing the standard account. They raise two central issues.
First, given that S4 is a lower bound on the logic of , every notion of relative necessity will conform
to its own version of the 4 axiom. Second, for the same reason, any relative necessities i and  j will
conform to a bizarre ‘mixed’ 4 axiom i p→ ji p. Although the former is a special case of the latter,
each problem shall be considered separately in order to appreciate the nature of the issue.
To begin with the former, consider the following S4 valid schematic line of reasoning:
(1) φ → (ψ →φ) PL Tautology
(2) (φ → (ψ →φ)) Necessitation, (1)
(3) φ →(ψ →φ) K, MP, (2)
(4) φ →φ 4
(5) φ →(ψ →φ) PL, (3), (4)
Now consider any proposition p and sentential constant L expressing the laws of physics. The following
is an instance of (5):
(L→ p)→(L→(L→ p))
Yet, by SA, this just abbreviates an instance of the 4 axiom for physical necessity. And the argument
generalises to every notion of relative necessity. But surely not all notions of relative necessity in the
target sense conform to a version of 4. To take an example, consider the notion of practical necessity, of
what is necessary given our current practical means. At some point in recent history, it was practically
impossible for us to engineer smartphones. However, at that point, surely it was within our practical
means to engineer technology which would provide us with the practical means to engineer smartphones.
Thus, although it was practically impossible for us to engineer smartphones, it was still practically
possibly possible for us to do so, which constitutes a failure of 4 for practical necessity.
To see the second problem, consider the sentential constant L expressing the actual laws of physics
and the sentential constant M expressing the ‘laws’ of metaphysics. The following is another instance
of (5):
7Williamson (2016, pp. 462-463) notes that various truths of metaphysics must either be expressed by L or conjoined to it for
reasons of adequacy.
8Humberstone (1981) attributes the problems for Smiley’s account to an observation made by Kit Fine in conversation.
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(L→ p)→(M→(L→ p))
Yet, by SA, this just abbreviates the claim that if a given proposition p is physically necessary then
it is metaphysically necessary that p is physically necessary. But for some propositions this is false:
even though superluminal travel is physically impossible, there are metaphysically possible worlds with
different laws of physics from which it is physically possible that bodies go faster than the actual speed
of light.
Given that the target notions of relative necessity are all the Kripke necessities, it is simply a failure
of SA that it is only able to characterise those Kripke necessities whose logic includes the 4 axiom for
the necessity operator in question. The issue is that the standard account attempts to formalise the idea
that i-necessity is absolute necessity relative to the i-laws with the use of sentential constants which
express the i-laws of a specific world. However, this use of constants generates the 4 axiom and mixed 4
axiom issues. What is needed is some means of formalising the variability of the i-laws from absolutely
possible world to world in the language of propositional modal logic.
3 Hale & Leech’s Proposal
3.1 The Proposal
Hale & Leech clearly appreciate the force of the above concerns. After highlighting the shortcomings
of Humberstone’s (1981; 2004) two-dimensional solution, they offer their own definition of relative
necessity. According to Hale & Leech’s proposal, each relative necessity operator i is to be defined in
terms of a corresponding propositional operator πi. In the case of, say, physical necessity, here denoted
as phys , the claim πphys(p) expresses that p is a law of physics.
For their first attempt, Hale & Leech propose that i-necessity can be defined as follows (where q is
the first variable not free in φ under some fixed ordering):9
HL1 iφ =d f ∃q(πi(q)∧(q→ φ))
In other words, p is i-necessary iff there is some i-law which strictly implies p. An instance of HL1 is
the claim that p is physically necessary iff there is some law of physics which strictly implies it.
One might immediately notice that this is somewhat weak. After all, surely the physical necessities
ought to be closed under conjunction. Indeed, all instances of the following schema are valid in any
normal modal logic:
K∧ (iφ ∧iψ)→i(φ ∧ψ)
But HL1 does not guarantee closure under conjunction, and so would generate non-valid instances of
K∧.10 To see this informally, imagine there were only two laws r and r′ such that r strictly implies p
and r′ strictly implies q. Since neither r nor r′ strictly implies p∧q, K∧ fails for physical necessity.
Hale & Leech are aware of this issue, and offer a more sophisticated definition of relative necessity
to handle the problem. In this definition, Γ is a finite set of propositional variables q1, ..., qn, the first n
variables (given some fixed order) not free in φ , and πi(q j) abbreviates the finitary conjunction πi(q1)∧
...∧πi(qn):
9Hale & Leech (2017, p. 13) do not state their account schematically, but instead state it in terms of propositional variables.
When stated in schematic form, one needs the condition that q is the first variable not free in φ in order to avoid clash of
variables.
10Officially, Hale & Leech do not provide a model-theoretic semantics or definition of validity for their language, although
they (p. 15) note that “the most obvious method” would be to follow Fine’s classic (1970) semantics. In Fine’s framework,
propositions are interpreted as sets of worlds, propositional variables and quantifiers range over the power set of worlds in a
model, and validity in a model is defined as usual. Hale & Leech (p. 16) emphasise that they are “reasonably confident that with
further work, [their] informal [proof] sketches can turned into rigorous model-theoretic [proofs]”. At points, their informal
presentation will be followed when discussing their view; however, the current paper’s positive proposal will be developed
explicitly in the setting of a model-theoretic framework similar to that of Fine (1970). Given that similarity, all claims of
validity regarding Hale & Leech’s proposal should be understood in terms of the notion of validity defined in Def. 5 below.
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According to this account, p is i-necessary iff there are some propositions, the i-laws, the conjunction
of which strictly implies p. An instance of HL2 is the claim that p is physically necessary iff there are
some propositions, the laws of physics, the conjunction of which strictly implies p. As can be easily
verified, HL2 validates K∧ for each relative necessity.
In HL2, Hale & Leech (p. 18, f.n. 23) ultimately want to treat n as variable. They recognise
that this requires a departure from the resources of ordinary quantified modal propositional logic. For
instance, they entertain the idea of introducing explicit quantification over the natural numbers into the
object-language in order to permit variability. However, a more standard alternative would be to state
their ultimate account of relative necessity in terms of a countably infinite disjunction of finite HL2
instances. Relatedly, Hale & Leech assume that n is finite. In principle, this finitary simplification
may ultimately have to be lifted in order to accommodate relative necessities based on infinitely many
‘laws’. After all, it is surely absolutely possible for there to be such notions of relative necessity. For
example, it is absolutely possible that Theresa May had infinitely many different goals in March 2019,
in which case an infinite body of propositions would restrict necessity given Theresa May’s goals in
March 2019. As a result, the ultimate regimentation of HL2 may have to be stated in a language with
infinitary conjunction operator which binds arbitrary sets of formulas. Although this creates additional
technical complexity, there should be no technical obstacle to introducing such infinitary resources to
modal languages. Indeed, some key invariance results in modal logic only hold in modal languages with
infinite conjunction binding arbitrary sets of formulae.11 Nevertheless, the focus of what follows will
be on the simple HL2 account, since it shares many features of interest with these more sophisticated
refinements.
Neatly, HL2 overcomes the two above problems with S4. To see this, consider the 4 axiom for i
according to HL2:
4′ ∃q1 ...∃qn(πi(q j) ∧ (
∧
q j∈Γ
q j→ p))→∃q1 ...∃qn(πi(q j) ∧ (
∧
q j∈Γ





This formula is not a theorem of S4 (or even S5): it is invalidated in models similar to the one given in
§4.2.1 below. Thus, the definition of relative necessity does not force all notions of relative necessity to
conform to the 4 axiom. A similar argument shows that HL2 overcomes the ‘mixed’ 4 problem too.
To close the discussion of HL2, it may be assumed on behalf of Hale & Leech that a given notion
of relative necessity i has a dual notion of possibility ♦i to be understood as follows (where again
q1, ...,qn are the first n variables, given some fixed order, not free in φ ):




Thus, in logically equivalent form, the formula ♦i p abbreviates the following formula:




That is to say, p is i-possible according to HL2 iff for all i-laws it is absolutely possible that they are
true along with p. If one endorses HL2, HL2♦ is an extremely natural way to define relative notions of
possibility; in what follows, talk of relative possibility on Hale & Leech’s view should be understood in
these terms.




Despite the advantages of HL2 over the standard account, it suffers from several serious problems. The
first is perhaps the most serious: HL2 fails to have the consequence that logical necessity is as broad
as any relative necessity. Since logical necessity was considered as absolute because it was as broad as
every notion of necessity, this is a seriously worrying defect. Indeed, put alternatively, Hale and Leech
cannot even recognise a notion of necessity which is absolute in the required sense, which is arguably a
fatal consequence of an account of relative necessity.
To see how this issue arises, fix on a given merely relative necessity, say physical necessity (phys),
and consider the following consequence of Absolute:
[1] (p→phys p)
Since  conforms to T, we may conclude the following:
[2] p→phys p
But one can see informally why Hale & Leech’s proposal does not validate [2]. Let > be the tautology
∀p(p→ p). Given the usual definition of validity as truth at all worlds in all models, > will be true at
all worlds in every model and therefore valid. Since  has a normal modal logic, > will be valid too.
But consider some world w in some model where there are no physical laws. Straightforwardly, at w the
following would be false:




The reason is that there are no physical laws at w, and so no proposition will be in the extension of
πi there. But, by HL2, [3] is equivalent to phys>. Thus, [2] is not valid according to HL2, and so
Absolute will not be valid either. Put alternatively, if there are i-lawless worlds for a given notion of
i-necessity, absolute necessity will not be as broad as that notion of necessity.
Overall, it is worrying even if there is a single notion of relative necessity which absolute necessity
is not as broad as. However, according to HL2 this phenomenon is quite widespread. After all, for
many notions of relative i-necessity it will be absolutely possible that there are i-lawless worlds. For
example, consider again necessity given Theresa May’s goals in March 2019. Although May has various
actual goals, it is absolutely possible that her goals could have been different. Instead of aiming for
Parliament to pass her Withdrawal Agreement she might have desired for the United Kingdom to retain
full membership of the European Single Market. Likewise, there is an absolute possibility in which May
has no goals whatsoever, which would be a lawless world in the relevant sense. Since it is plausible
that the phenomenon of absolutely possible i-lawless worlds arises for many notions of i-necessity, HL2
predicts that absolute necessity is not as broad as myriad relative necessities.
Hale & Leech are aware of a version of the problem with Absolute but they attempt to underplay
it.12 They write (pp. 18-19; their emphasis):
That [Absolute] should be validated is, no doubt, just what one would think, if one thinks
about relative necessity in essentially world-terms: that is, so that what is physically neces-
sary, for instance, is essentially just what is true throughout a restricted range of all logically
possible worlds. For then, since anything logically necessary (i.e. true throughout the whole
unrestricted range) must be true throughout any restriction of it, it must also be physically
necessary. Our answer to this is that it is just a mistake to think of forms of relative neces-
sity as fundamentally to be understood in world terms. If we drop that prejudice, then it
can seem entirely natural and correct to characterise or define a form of relative necessity
in such a way that logical necessity does not automatically ensure relative necessity.
12They attribute the version of the problem they discuss to David Makinson; in their discussion, the problem is presented under
a guise which is much different to the current one.
8
Nonetheless, despite Hale & Leech’s insistence that Absolute should only be appealing to those in the
grip of a worlds-based reduction of modality, it ought to be clear from the initial set up that this is just
not true. The reason why Absolute is so plausible is because absolute necessity is characterised by the
fact that it is as broad as all other notions of necessity. Indeed, how else would it be characterised?
Its absoluteness consists in this feature. Moreover, claims of comparative broadness can be used to
provide insight into the relations between different notions of necessity, which is surely an ambition
of our modal theorising.13 The capacity to express such claims does not seem like an artefact of the
worlds-based conception, but rather a requirement of modal theory.
At the heart of the above problem is Hale & Leech’s treatment of relative i-necessities at worlds at
which there are no i-laws. According to HL2, at worlds with no i-laws no proposition is i-necessary
since claims of i-necessity involve existential quantification over i-laws. But this is difficult to square
with familiar glosses of relative necessities. For example, consider the following typical necessary
condition on physical possibility:
PP If a proposition is physically possible at world, it is logically consistent with the world’s laws of
physics.
Indeed, Hale & Leech (p. 2) appear to endorse this very condition:
Thus on one common view, physical necessity is a matter of following from the laws of
physics, and physical possibility is compatibility [i.e. logical consistency] with them.
However, according to HL2/HL2♦, at worlds with no laws of physics it is vacuously true that every
proposition whatsoever (including contradictory propositions) is physically possible. Yet this violates
the highly plausible condition that, whatever the circumstances, only logically possible propositions are
physically possible. Moreover, as stressed above, since no proposition is physically necessary at lawless
worlds according to HL2, not even arbitrary tautologies will be physically necessary there either. But
on the typical definition of validity as truth at all worlds in all models, it would follow that notions of
relative necessity do not even have a normal modal logic, since they would fail to conform to the rule of
necessitation.
There are thus several concerns facing HL2. There are the minor issues that HL2 is too simple
to handle cases in which there are infinitely many i-laws, and that HL2 must be modified to permit
variability in the number of laws. However, more worryingly, there are the major issues regarding the
failure of Absolute, and the mishandling of lawless worlds, the latter of which is essentially responsible
the former. Finally, there is the subsidiary problem of the rule of necessitation failing for notions of
relative necessity, which again is an artefact of the mishandling of lawless worlds. Together, these
problems motivate the need for a new definition of relative necessity, preferably in terms of absolute
necessity.
Nevertheless, HL2 is clearly on the right track, as witnessed by its predictions in cases with a non-
zero finite number of i-laws. As a consequence, it might seem that a slightly generalised version of HL2
fares much better. To see this, imagine that the object-language is enriched with an infinitary conjunc-
tion operator which binds arbitrary sets of formulas and equates empty conjunctions with the tautologous
proposition. In this infinitary setting, HL2 can be generalised to the claim that for a proposition to be
i-necessary is for it to be absolutely strictly implied by the arbitrary conjunction of the i-laws. Without
formalising the proposal, one would expect this generalised version of HL2 to avoid most of the prob-
lems which faced HL2. For instance, clearly the generalised version would no longer incorporate the
restriction to finitely many laws. Moreover, at i-lawless worlds, the restricting proposition for relative i-
necessity would simply be the tautologous proposition. Consequently, at such worlds relative i-necessity
collapses into absolute necessity, thus ensuring Absolute. Indeed, Strohminger & Yli-Vakkuri (2019)
sketch an analysis of relative necessity similar to HL2 in terms of infinite conjunction of exactly this
13For recent examples of such insight, see Williamson (2016) and Bacon (2018). See also Hale’s (1996) classic and influential
discussion of absolute necessity.
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kind, and suggest that they expect it to overcome the problems facing HL2. Arguably, the only remain-
ing issues are that the account requires it to be absolutely necessary that the i-laws form a set, but this
issue could perhaps be finessed with even more extreme infinitary resources.
However, rather than complicate the propositional language by resorting to any infinitary measures
whatsoever, there is a much simpler option available. Put intuitively, the idea is to exploit the fact
that, given our particular assumption of Booleanism, the arbitrary conjunction of the i-laws will just be
the weakest proposition that strictly implies all i-laws. Yet, as will be shown, that proposition can be
characterised simply in terms of propositional quantification and the ‘i-law’ predicate. Thus, the relative
i-necessity of a given proposition can be characterised as that proposition’s being strictly implied by
the weakest proposition that strictly implies all i-laws, which is statable without appeal to any infinitary
resources.14 The next section develops this simple idea carefully and shows that it overcomes all of the
problems facing HL2 in addition to the initial S4 problems.
4 A New Proposal
4.1 Regimentation
The aim of this section is to develop the above characterisation carefully. On the proposed way of
developing this characterisation, Absolute will be validated and the issue with lawless worlds will be
rectified. Moreover, the proposal will ensure a normal modal logic for each notion of relative necessity.
Furthermore, due to the similarities of the new proposal with HL2, the new proposal will also overcome
the S4-related problems that afflicted the standard account. Indeed, more generally, the new proposal
will yield the welcome result that its notions of relative necessity are exactly the Kripke necessities, thus
ensuring that it captures the initial target notion of relative necessity.
The exact statement of the new proposal shall be postponed until some technical resources have been
introduced. The technical resources are to be introduced model-theoretically, so we must first specify a
language.
Def. 1 The language L is defined using: countably many propositional variables (p,q, ...); count-
ably many monadic predicate constants (π1,π2, ...); conjunction (∧) and negation (¬) as the
only truth-functional connectives; the unary modal operator  (absolute necessity), and a
universal quantifier binding propositional variables (∀).
The well-formed formulas of the language are given by the following rule (where α is a
propositional variable and ξ is a monadic predicate constant):
φ := α | ξ (α) | ¬ψ | (ψ ∧χ) | ∀α(ψ) |ψ
We write ∃ as an abbreviation for the string ¬∀¬ and ♦ as an abbreviation for the string ¬¬.
We introduce→,∨, and↔ by the usual abbreviations.
The class of models for this language shall not permit contingency in what propositions there are. Thus,
to this end, we shall use constant domain models for quantified propositional logics; the class of models
is similar to that defined in the classic Fine (1970) which, in effect, employs a constant domain model
theory.
Def. 2 A model M of the language is a pair 〈W ,V 〉, where:
W is a non-empty set (‘the worlds’), and
V is a total function (‘the interpretation function’) from pairs 〈ξ ,w〉 (for ξ a predicate con-
stant, and w ∈W ) to subsets of P(W ).
14Indeed, Strohminger & Yli-Vakkuri (2019, p. 6, n. 11; p. 7, n. 12) themselves suggest that a ‘higher-order analysis’ of relative
necessity is needed, which the following simpler proposal may be viewed as providing.
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Def. 3 A variable assignment g for the language is a total function from propositional variables to
subsets of W . We write g(α/d) for a variable assignment which differs from g at most in
that it assigns d to α .
The next step is to define a truth at a world on an assignment.
Def. 4 We define ‘(M,w) |=g φ ’ (‘true at w on g’) for φ a well-formed formula, M= 〈W ,V 〉, and
w ∈W recursively in the following manner. In this definition, α is propositional variable, ξ
is a monadic predicate constant, and φ and ψ are both well-formed formulae.
(M,w) |=g α iff w ∈ g(α)
(M,w) |=g ξ (α) iff g(α) ∈ V (ξ ,w)
(M,w) |=g ¬φ iff (M,w) 6|=g φ
(M,w) |=g φ ∧ψ iff (M,w) |=g φ and (M,w) |=g ψ
(M,w) |=g φ iff (M,u) |=g φ , for all u ∈W
(M,w) |=g ∀α(φ) iff (M,w) |=g(α/p) φ , for all p ∈P(W )
Def. 5 A formula φ is valid in M= 〈W ,V 〉 iff (M,w) |=g φ for all w ∈W , and all variable assign-
ments g. A formula φ is valid iff it is valid in all models.
Note that this semantics validates the Barcan formula and its converse for the propositional quantifier,
as is standard in necessitist logics which validate S5.15
With this technical apparatus, we are now in a position to state the new proposed definition of relative
necessity. Intuitively, the idea is that p is i-necessary at a world iff it is strictly implied by the weakest
proposition that strictly implies every i-law at that world. For example, p is physically necessary at a
world iff it is strictly implied by the weakest proposition that strictly implies every physical law at that
world. To appreciate this idea, it may help to emphasise that in cases where there are finitely many
i-laws at a given world, the weakest proposition that strictly implies every i-law at that world will just be
the proposition expressed by the finite conjunction of the i-laws. As a result of this, the new account of
relative necessity will agree with the welcome predictions of HL2 in cases of a non-zero finite number
of i-laws. To state the definition formally, we introduce two metalinguistic abbreviations:
Oπi p =d f ∀q(πi(q)→(p→ q))
L πi p =d f Oπi(p)∧ ∀q(Oπi(q)→(q→ p))
Put informally, Oπi p means that p strictly implies all propositions that are i-laws, and L
πi p means that
p is the weakest such proposition with respect to strict implication. To aid one’s understanding of these
notions, it may help to notice that since propositions are modelled as sets of absolutely possible worlds,
one proposition’s strictly implying another is modelled as the former being a subset of the latter. Given
this equivalence, Oπi p can be understood as the claim that p is a subset of all i-laws, and L πi p can be
understood as the claim that p is the greatest lower bound on the i-laws with respect to subset inclusion.
When L πi p is true at a world on a given assignment, whatever p is assigned will be referred to as the
i-lawful proposition of that world. Informally, one might wish to think of the i-lawful proposition as
15The opening section noted that S4 is a lower bound on the logic of absolute necessity; indeed, this is a theorem of Bacon’s
(2018) characterisation of absolute necessity. To argue that S5 is an upper bound on the logic of absolute necessity, Bacon
adapts an informal argument due to Timothy Williamson (2013, pp. 114) which appeals to Scroggs’s (1951) theorem that every
proper extension of S5 is the logic of a single finite frame. The current model theory validates S5 for absolute necessity as a
simplifying working hypothesis.
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the arbitrary conjunction the i-laws, where the empty conjunction is simply the tautologous proposition.
However, an advantage of the L πi characterisation is that it defines the i-lawful proposition simply in
terms of already available propositional quantification.
It is important to stress that since propositions are treated as sets of worlds in a given model, the
domain of propositions (i.e. the power set of the worlds in the model) will form a complete Boolean
algebra under the usual set-theoretic operations in the sense that every subset of propositions has a least
upper bound and a greatest lower bound with respect to subset inclusion. Thus, for any set of proposi-
tions there is guaranteed to be a weakest proposition that strictly implies all its members. Helpfully, this
means that at each world exactly one proposition will satisfy L πi for a given predicate πi.
The new definition of relative necessity can now be stated as follows (where q is the first variable
not free in φ ):
RN iφ =d f ∃q(L πi(q)∧(q→ φ))
To restate the intuitive gloss: i-necessity at a world is a matter of being strictly implied by the weakest
proposition that strictly implies all i-laws at that world.
4.2 Results
In certain respects, RN is similar to both HL2 and SA. This section will highlight these similarities,
but also emphasise its crucial differences. These differences will ensure that RN overcomes each of the
problems which HL2 and SA faced.
4.2.1 4 Axiom Schema
Recall that one problem with SA is that it validated all instances of the 4 axiom schema for every notion
of relative necessity. It may be shown that RN does not have this feature.
Consider a relative necessity operator i. According to RN, the 4 axiom schema for i is stated as
follows:
4i ∃q(L πi(q) ∧ (q→ φ))→ [∃q(L πi(q) ∧ (q→∃q(L πi(q) ∧ (q→ φ))]
The following is a countermodel to an instance of 4i. Let M= 〈W ,V 〉, such that:
W = {0,1,2}
V (πi,0) = {{0,1},{0,1,2}}
V (πi,1) = {{0,1,2}}






Let g be a variable assignment such that g(p) = {0,1}. Say that 4i(p) is the instance of 4i with p substi-
tuted for φ . With g as above, it can be checked that (M,0) 6|=g 4i(p).
The 4i axiom schema according to RN is a special case of the ‘mixed’ 4i j schema according to RN,
which is stated as follows:
4i j ∃q(L πi(q) ∧ (q→ φ))→ [∃q(L πi(q) ∧ (q→∃q(L π j(q) ∧ (q→ φ))]
As a consequence, instances of 4i j are invalidated by the model theory too.
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4.2.2 Absolute
Next, it can be shown that ∀pk(p→  j p) is valid whenever k and  j are necessity operators. To
this end, it is helpful to first establish that in a given model each notion of relative necessity corresponds
to an accessibility relation in that model. To express this carefully, first say that for a set S and X a set of
sets, the intersection of X with respect to S (∩SX) is defined as follows.
∩SX = {y ∈ S : y ∈ x for all x ∈ X}
One can then define the accessibility relation which corresponds to a given notion of relative neces-
sity as follows.
Def. 6 For a predicate constant πi and model M= 〈W ,V 〉, Ri = {〈x,y〉 : y ∈ ∩W V (πi,x)}.
With this definition in mind, it is first helpful to observe that from a given world w the worlds in which
w’s i-lawful proposition is true are exactly those worlds in the intersection of the extension of πi at w
with respect to the background space of worlds.
Theorem 1. For a model M= 〈W ,V 〉 and a variable assignment g, (M,w) |=g L πi(p) iff
∩W V (πi,w) = g(p).
Proof sketch. As mentioned previously, (M,w) |=g L πi(p) equates to g(p) being the greatest lower
bound on V (πi,w) with respect to ⊆ in P(W ) (hereafter these qualifications are left
implicit). It thus suffices to show that ∩W V (πi,w) is also the greatest lower bound
on V (πi,w). It helps to separate the cases, so first assume that V (πi,w) 6= /0. Clearly,
for any s ∈ V (πi,w), ∩W V (πi,w)⊆ s. Moreover, ∩W V (πi,w) contains every u such
that u ∈ s for all s ∈ V (πi,w), so there is no lower bound ∆ on V (πi,w) such that
∩W V (πi,w)⊂ ∆. However, if V (πi,w) = /0 then it is vacuously true that ∩W V (πi,w)
is a lower bound on V (πi,w). Moreover, given that V (πi,w) = /0, it follows that
∩W V (πi,w) = W and is thus the greatest lower bound on V (πi,w).

Theorem 1 may then be employed to derive a semantic clause for a given notion of i-necessity using
Ri.
Theorem 2. (Accessibility) For a relative necessity i, one may derive the following semantic
clause: (M,w) |=g iφ iff for all u such that wRiu, (M,u) |=g φ .
Proof. All steps are given by either the semantic clauses, Def. 6, or Theorem 1.
(M,w) |=g ∃q(L πi(q)∧(q→ φ))
iff (M,w) |=g(q/p) L πi(q)∧(q→ φ) for some p ∈P(W ) iff
iff ∩W V (πi,w) = g(q/p)(q) and (M,w) |=g(q/p) (q→ φ)
iff (M,u) |=g φ for all u ∈ ∩W V (πi,w) = g(q/p)(q)
iff (M,u) |=g φ for all u such that vRiu. 
To return to the main thread, notice that for each πi and model M = 〈W ,V 〉, Ri ⊆ W ×W . Thus,
Theorem 2 can be used to establish that p→ i p is valid for i whenever i is a relative necessity
operator. However, as can easily be checked by using the semantics and definition of validity,  obeys
the rule of necessitation.
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Necessitation If φ is valid, then φ is valid.
Given the above, we may derive a generalised rule of necessitation for any given notion of relative
necessity i.
Generalised Necessitation If φ is valid, then iφ is valid.
As a consequence, k(p→ i p) is valid whenever k and i are necessity operators. Using the
semantics, one can easily verify that Absolute is valid as a consequence.
Theorem 3. (Absolute) ∀pk(p→ j p) is valid, whenever k and  j are necessity operators.
Relatedly, another advantage of RN is that there is a sense in which every accessibility relation in a given
model generates a notion of relative necessity.
Theorem 4. (Generation) Let M= 〈W ,V 〉 be a model such that R ⊆W 2. There is a model
MR = 〈W ,VR〉 such that (MR ,w) |=g iφ iff for all u such that wRu (MR ,u) |=g φ .
Proof. For every w ∈W , let R(w) = {v : wRv}. Let VR be the interpretation function such that for
every w∈W , p∈ VR(πi,w) iff R(w)⊆ p, and VR(ξ ,w) = V (ξ ,w) otherwise. Observe that
wRu iff u ∈R(w) iff u ∈ ∩W VR(πi,w). Hence (MR ,w) |=g iφ iff for all u such that wRu
(MR ,u) |=g φ .
Both Theorem 4 and Theorem 2 are reasonable desiderata on an account of relative necessity. If
met, respectively they ensure that to each accessibility relation in a model corresponds an in principle
definable notion of relative necessity, and vice-versa. However, notice that SA fails to meet an analogue
of Theorem 4, since its notions of relative necessity correspond only to transitive accessibility relations.
Similarly, HL2 fails to meet an analogue of Theorem 2. According to HL2, for a given notion of
relative i-necessity, at i-lawless worlds it is i-possible that contradictions are true, but on standard model-
theoretic treatments of normal modal logics, such notions of relative necessity will not correspond to
accessibility relations in models.
4.2.3 Kripke Necessities
Complementing the previous section, Theorem 2 and Theorem 4 can be used to establish the neat
result that the RN relative necessities are exactly the Kripke necessities.16 To make this claim precise,
a number of further definitions are required. First, we define what it is for a modal logic to be the logic
of a Kripke frame. The result will then be stated as a correspondence between the logics of relative
necessity (according to RN) and the logics of Kripke frames.
Def. 7 The modal propositional language (MPL) is the fragment of L without the universal quan-
tifier and monadic predicate constants. A modal logic is a set of MPL formulas.
Def. 8 An MPL frame is a pair 〈W ,R〉 in which W is a non-empty set and R ⊆W 2.
Def. 9 An MPL model based on an MPL frame F = 〈W ,R〉 is a triple 〈W ,R,V 〉 in which V is a
total function from propositional variables of MPL to subsets of W .
It is helpful to note that for any MPL model 〈W ,R,V 〉, V is just a variable assignment for
an L model based on the same set of worlds and vice-versa.
16Thanks to an anonymous reviewer for conjecturing this theorem and encouraging me to explore it.
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Def. 10 ‘(M ,w) |= φ ’ is defined for φ a well-formed MPL formula, M = 〈W ,R,V 〉 an MPL
model, and w∈W recursively in the following manner. In this definition, α is propositional
variable, and φ and ψ are both well-formed MPL formulae.
(M ,w) |= α iff w ∈ V (α)
(M ,w) |= ¬φ iff (M ,w) 6|= φ
(M ,w) |= φ ∧ψ iff (M ,w) |= φ and (M ,w) |= ψ
(M ,w) |=φ iff (M ,u) |= φ , for all u such that wRu
Def. 11 A formula φ is valid in an MPL model M = 〈W ,R,V 〉 iff (M ,w) |= φ , for all w ∈W . A
formula φ is valid on an MPL frame F = 〈W ,R〉 iff it is valid in all MPL models based on
F .
Def. 12 For an MPL frame F , the modal logic of F is ΛF = {φ ∈ MPL : φ is valid on F}.
Def. 13 For φ a formula of MPL, φi is the formula whose metalinguistic abbreviation is given by the
result of substituting each occurrence of  for an occurrence of i. (Given the abbreviation
conventions for i, φi will abbreviate a formula of L but not of MPL.)
Def. 14 For a model M of L (as defined in Def. 2), the modal logic of M is ΛMPLM = {φ ∈ MPL :
φi is valid in M}. (Note the restriction to MPL formulas.)
Def. 15 For a model M = 〈W ,V 〉 of L , F i(M) is the MPL frame 〈W ,Ri〉, with Ri defined in
terms of V as in Def. 6.
Def. 16 For an MPL frame F = 〈W ,R〉, Mi(F ) is the L model M= 〈W ,VR〉, with VR defined
in terms of R as in the proof of Theorem 4.
Theorem 5. (Kripke Necessities) A modal logic is the logic of an L model iff it is the logic of an
MPL frame.
Proof. We first establish two helpful lemmas.
Lemma 1. For any MPL frame F = 〈W ,R〉 and any MPL model M = 〈W ,R,V 〉 based
on F , for all w ∈W , (M ,w) |= φ iff (Mi(F ),w) |=V φi.
Lemma 1 is established by induction on the complexity of φ . The base case is imme-
diate from the use of V as the variable assignment over Mi(F ), and the cases for the
truth-functional connectives are routine. So assume that for all w ∈ W , (M ,w) |= ψ iff
(Mi(F ),w) |=V ψi. Then reason as follows to complete the proof of Lemma 1.
(M ,w) |=ψ iff (M ,u) |= ψ for all u such that wRu Def. 10
iff (Mi(F ),u) |=V ψi for all u such that wRu IH
iff (Mi(F ),w) |=V iψi Theorem 4
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Lemma 1 has the following corollary.
Corollary 1. ΛF = ΛMPLMi(F ) for any MPL frame F = 〈W ,R〉.
There is a similar lemma in the other direction.
Lemma 2. For any L model M = 〈W ,V 〉 and all w ∈ W , (M,w) |=g φi iff (M ,w) |= φ ,
where M is the MPL model 〈F i(M), g〉.
Lemma 2 is also established by induction on the complexity of φ . As before, we only
consider the case for necessity claims. So assume that for all w ∈ W , (M,w) |=g ψi iff
(M ,w) |= ψ . Then reason as follows to complete the proof of Lemma 2.
(M,w) |=g iψi iff (M,u) |=g ψi for all u such that wRiu Theorem 2
iff (M ,u) |= ψ for all u such that wRiu IH
iff (M ,w) |=ψ Def. 10
Lemma 2 has the following corollary.
Corollary 2. ΛMPLM = ΛF i(M) for any L model M= 〈W ,V 〉.
Theorem 5 then follows from Corollary 1 and Corollary 2.
Theorem 5 shows that RN meets the initial target of characterising all the relative necessities of interest,
the Kripke necessities. It is a significant advantage of RN that it is able to yield such a result.
4.2.4 Lawless Worlds
Recall that according to HL2 at worlds with no i-laws no proposition is i-necessary and every proposition
is i-possible. This was in tension with familiar glosses of i-necessity. For example, if physical necessity
is simply absolute necessity given the laws of physics, then if there are no laws of physics, there are
no propositions to restrict what is physically necessary. Thus, one would expect that physical necessity
would collapse into absolute necessity. However, it can be shown that RN meets this expectation and
thus conforms with this familiar gloss of i-necessity.
Consider a model M1 = 〈W ,V 1〉 just like M in §4.2.1 except:
V 1(πi,w) = /0, for all w ∈W
We want to show that (M1,w) |=g p iff (M1,w) |=g i p for an arbitrary propositional variable p.
Of course, the left-to-right direction is immediate from Absolute. But notice that since V 1(πi,w) =
/0, ∩W V 1(πi,w) = W . Thus for all u ∈ W , wRiu. Hence, as intended, when there are no i-laws at
a given world the i-possible worlds from that world are all and only the absolutely possible worlds,
which demonstrates the collapse of i-necessity and absolute necessity at such i-lawless worlds. This is
preferable to the verdict of HL2 that even absolutely impossible propositions are i-possible at i-lawless
worlds.
Relatedly, we can note that if the i-laws are inconsistent at some world in some model, in the sense
that their intersection with respect to the set of all worlds in that model is empty, then at that world
everything is i-necessary but nothing is i-possible. This is another welcome result, for such inconsistent
sets of laws and their corresponding relative necessities exhibit a certain degeneracy. To appreciate the
result, consider a model M′ = 〈W ,D ,V ′〉 just like M1 directly above, except:
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V ′(πi,w) = {S,W −S}, for some S⊆W
Speaking informally, it follows that the only proposition (i.e. subset of W ) which strictly implies all the
i-laws at w is the impossible proposition, that is /0. As a consequence, wRiu iff u ∈ /0. In other words,
there is no u ∈ W such that wRiu. Thus, given the derived semantic clause above, it is vacuously true
that every φ is i-necessary at w and no φ is i-possible at w.
5 Concluding Remarks
This article has criticised Hale & Leech’s (2017) account of relative necessity, which itself resulted from
their criticisms of the standard account of relative necessity. The paper then proposed a new account of
relative necessity which met the criticisms of both Hale & Leech’s account and the standard account.
To close the discussion, it is interesting to note that certain complications arise once various working
assumptions are lifted. To begin with, from the outset it was made explicit that propositional necessitism
was a working assumption of the discussion. If this assumption is lifted, RN may be an inadequate
definition of relative necessity; in such a contingentist setting, the propositional quantifier in RN will
not range over all absolutely possible propositions, depriving RN of its intended generality. This may
come as no surprise: as is typical, non-modal quantificational claims lose their intended generality
when simply copied from a necessitist setting and pasted into a contingentist one. When faced with
such cases, a natural contingentist reaction has been to offer certain modalised contingentist analogue
principles following the lead of Fine (1977). However, as Fine himself and recent commentators have
recognised, this modalising strategy is difficult to execute in the case of propositional quantification.17
Unfortunately, at the time of writing, such difficulties make it unclear whether an adequate analogue of
RN can be articulated in a contingentist setting. Indeed, clarity on this issue is likely to be gained only if
a more general contingentist method of simulating higher-order necessitist discourse can be established.
Finally, it was made explicit that the account relied on a conception of propositions according to
which it is absolutely necessary that there is a weakest proposition which strictly implies all i-laws.
On alternative conceptions of propositions, however, there may be be no such unique proposition. In
particular, on some conceptions of propositions they may not form a complete Boolean algebra under the
usual truth-functional operations. For example, in certain cases, there may always be various minimally
weak propositions which strictly imply all i-laws, but no unique candidate. One would expect that RN
could be adapted to such settings by identifying the i-necessity of a proposition with that proposition’s
being strictly implied by all of the minimally weak propositions which strictly imply all i-laws. However,
of course, the specific details of the non-Boolean setting matter greatly, so questions regarding how to
define relative necessity in such settings are left for future work.
17See in particular Williamson (2013, chap. 7) and Fritz & Goodman (2017).
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